

論文要旨説明書

報告論文のタイトル : Optimal law enforcement with multiple criminal organizations

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論文要旨 (800 字から 1200 字、英文の場合は 300 から 450 語)

This paper develops a model with regard to the optimal law enforcement on organized crime with multiple criminal organizations (the Mafias) which regulate the criminal market by extortion. It enables us to consider strategic interaction relationships among the criminal organizations and the government. This paper shows that welfare effects of introducing multiple criminal organizations depends on how they face a competition in this criminal market. If each criminal organization faces a fierce competition, it is hard for criminal organizations to make profits and play the role as a regulator. On the other hand, if there exists no competition among criminal organizations, introducing multiple criminal organizations contributes to the social welfare improvement. This indicates that the classical view stressing the desirable effects of monopolistic criminal organization is not always supported. Furthermore, by considering the costly conflicts among criminal organizations, this paper also explores whether harsh penalties on the criminal market induce them to engage in conflicts and shows that it can be difficult to sustain the desirable criminal markets regulated by multiple criminal organizations.