

## 論文要旨説明書

**報告論文のタイトル**： Do Agency Contracts Facilitate Upstream Collusion?

**報告者・共著者**（大学院生は所属機関の後に（院生）と記入してください。）

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**論文要旨**（800 字から 1200 字、英文の場合は 300 から 450 語）

This paper presents a study of whether agency contracts facilitate collusion among upstream manufacturers, as compared to traditional wholesale contracts. We consider an infinitely repeated game with a monopoly platform and multiple manufacturers. Our analysis shows that the critical discount factor, above which the upstream collusion can be sustainable by Nash-reversion trigger strategies, is the same under wholesale and agency contracts. That result indicates that the agency contract is not necessarily anticompetitive. By contrast, in an extended model with competing platforms, we show that the agency contract facilitates upstream collusion because accepting it under the agency contract mitigates platform competition.